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Abstract
We present a system of behavioral axioms for preferences over menus that
is motivated by three assumptions. First, the decision maker is uncertain
ex ante (i.e. at the time of choosing a menu) about her ex post (i.e. at the
time of choosing an option within her chosen menu) preferences over options,
and she anticipates that this subjective uncertainty will only resolve after
the ex post stage. Second, she is averse to ex post indecisiveness (i.e. to
having to choose between options that she cannot rank with certainty). Third,
when evaluating a menu she discards options that are dominated (i.e. inferior
to another option whatever her ex post preferences may be) and restricts
attention to the undominated ones. Under these assumptions, the decision
maker has a preference for commitment in the sense of preferring menus with
fewer undominated alternatives. We derive a representation in which the
decision maker's uncertainty about her ex post preferences is captured by
means of a subjective state space, which in turn determines which options
are undominated in a given menu, and in which the decision maker fears,
whenever indecisive, to choose an option that will turn out to be the worst
(undominated) one according to the realization of her ex post preferences.
Keywords. Opportunity sets, subjective uncertainty, indecisiveness, dominance.
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Consider a two-stage decision situation. In the rst stage, the decision maker has
to choose a menu (or opportunity set). In the second stage, she chooses an option
from this menu. We refer to these two stages as the ex ante and ex post stage,
respectively. We assume that the decision maker is uncertain ex ante about her ex
post preferences over options. Standard models in the literature on opportunity sets
use this assumption in order to motivate a desire for exibility (Kreps, 1979; Nehring,
1999; Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini, 2001; Dekel, Lipman, Rustichini, and Sarver,
2007a; Ozdenoren, 2002; Epstein, Marinacci, and Seo, 2007). According to these
models, larger menus can never be worse than smaller ones when a decision maker
expects to learn her ex post preferences before actually having to choose an option.
In contrast to these approaches, we consider a decision maker who anticipates that
her uncertainty about her ex post preferences will only resolve after she will have
chosen an option. Such a decision maker will nd herself at the ex post stage, at
least for some menus, in a situation of indecisiveness, i.e. of having to choose an
option without being certain which option she prefers. We assume that the decision
maker is averse to such situations of indecisiveness and, therefore, prefers smaller
menus to larger ones, to the extent that smaller menus enable her to avoid these
situations.
As an illustrative example, consider Bethy, who is a manager of a small division
in a large company. She is faced with the problem of assigning the execution of a
project to one of the employees. Right now she can only choose among the employees
in her division, whom she knows well and has previously observed in similar projects.
She is rather certain that Alan would be the best person to entrust with the project.
However, just before Bethy can make the decision, the CEO of the company contacts
her and suggests that she now has the possibility to pick an employee not just
from her own division, but from the entire company sta. Bethy has only limited
knowledge of the sta outside of her division. In particular, she knows that Bob,
Chris and Dave are well suited to execute the project, but she nds these three
candidates hard to compare: e.g., Bob would be excellent on the nancial side of
the project, but Chris would do better than Bob when it comes to marketing, and
Dave is not so good when it comes to marketing or nance but has outperformed the
other two in terms of creativity in the past. Bethy knows that all of these dimensions
might be relevant for the success of the project, but the current situation makes it
dicult to forecast which one would be most important. She is faced with a hard
choice: she has to make an important decision (for the company, for her career and
that of the person who will be in charge of the project), and take full responsibility
1for this decision in front of the CEO, without being able to condently go for either
one of the possible options. In fact, she would have much preferred sticking to her
division, which would have avoided her this situation of indecisiveness altogether.
Thus she would willing to forego candidates that are potentially better than Alan
(in fact, she may even be sure that, e.g., Bob is superior to Alan in all regards) in
order to avoid the pain of having to choose in a situation of indecisiveness.1.
Extending previous work from Guerdjikova and Zimper (2008), we propose and
axiomatize a representation of preferences over opportunity sets that captures this
aversion to indecisiveness. More specically, the decision maker's ex ante uncertainty
about her ex post preferences is captured by means of a subjective state space,
each subjective state corresponding to a utility function over options. Since the
decision maker anticipates that she will only learn the subjective state after she
will have chosen an option, she is indecisive between two options whenever the rst
one is ranked above the second one in some subjective state whereas the second
one is ranked above the rst one in some other subjective state. When evaluating
a menu, the decision maker rst discards all options that are dominated by some
other option in the menu (i.e. ranked below this other option in all subjective states),
as these options are clearly irrelevant for her nal choice. Restricting attention to
undominated options, then, the representation captures indecisiveness aversion by
evaluating the menu, in each subjective state, by the utility of the worst option
in this state. To give an intuition, this is as if the decision maker viewed herself
confronted with a malevolent nature that would rst select the subjective state,
then manage to have her choose the worst possible option in this subjective state,
and then only reveal her the subjective state. Finally, an increasing aggregator
transforms the vector of subjective-state contingent utilities into the ex ante utility
of the menu.
Our representation exhibits a preference for commitment, once one restricts at-
tention to undominated alternatives. In other words, the decision maker always
prefers a menu with a smaller set of undominated alternatives. It is noteworthy
that our representation does not identify which option will eventually be chosen
by the decision maker (not even contingently on the subjective state, since in fact
the decision maker does not know the subjective state at the time of choosing an
option). Thus our notion of indecisiveness aversion arises from the fact of having
to choose without knowing one's preferences rather than from the outcome of this
choice. In this regard, our model diers from models of temptation (Gul and Pe-
1In this sense, the decision maker who conforms to our theory prefers to avoid taking responsi-
bility for her decisions. This interpretation was suggested to us by Klaus Nehring.
2sendorfer, 2001; Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini, 2007), regret (Sarver, 2008), costly
contemplation (Ergin and Sarver, 2008), or thinking aversion (Ortoleva, 2008).
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present our setup and utility
representation and compare it to Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2001)'s ordinal
utility representation. In section 3 we introduce our axiom system and derive our
representation result. Section 4 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 Setup and representation
Let B be a nite set of prizes and let (B) be the set of all probability distributions
(lotteries) over B which stand for the options of our approach. Given ;0 2 (B)
and  2 [0;1], we dene the -mixture of  and 0 as usual and denote it by
 + (1   )0. A non-empty subset x of (B) is interpreted as an opportunity set
or menu, i.e. as the commitment to choose some lottery  2 x at a given later date.
We refer to the choice of a menu as the ex ante stage and to the (implicit) choice of
a lottery within the chosen menu as the ex post stage. We endow the set of lotteries
with the Euclidean metric and the set of menus with the Hausdor metric.
We restrict attention to menus that are polytopes, i.e. convex hulls of (non-
empty) nite sets of lotteries.2 Let X denote the set of all such menus. We consider
a decision maker endowed with a weak preference relation % over X, capturing her
ex ante ranking of menus. From % we dene the strict preference relation  and
the indierence relation  as usual. We look for an ordinal utility representation of
% as follows:
Denition. An indecisiveness averse representation of % consists in
(i) A non-empty, closed, convex set U  RB of utility functions such that, for
all ;0 2 (B),
fg  conv(f;
0g) , [8u 2 U;u    u  
0]: (1)
(ii) A functional c : X ! X such that3
c(x) = f 2 xj@
0 2 X;U  
0 > U  g; (2)
2We can think of these menus as determined by a nite set of linear constraints or, equivalently,
we can think of the decision maker as considering nite menus but being able to randomize be-
tween options. the proof of our representation theorem relies on this restriction to polytopes (see
appendix).
3In the appendix it is shown that if x is a polytope then so is c(x) (a fact which is not true for
arbitrary compact menus).
3where U  0 > U   means u  0  u   for all u 2 U and u  0 > u  
for some u 2 U.
(iii) An aggregator g : RU ! R, continuous and weakly increasing on
U(X) = f( min
2c(x)
u  )u2Ujx 2 Xg, (3)



















The interpretation of the representation is that the decision maker envisions a
set of possible ex post preferences. Each of these is an expected-utility preference
represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u 2 U, so U can be
interpreted as a (subjective) state space. A lottery  dominates a lottery 0 if
and only if  has a higher expected utility than 0 regardless of the ex post utility
function. As we noticed in the introduction, dominated lotteries are never chosen
and their addition does not inuence the evaluation of a menu. Therefore, we
can interpret condition (1) to say that if we add the dominated lottery 0 to the
singleton menu , the resulting menu conv (f;0g) will be exactly as good as fg.
Simultaneously, we require this condition to characterize the dominance relation
between lotteries.
For a given set of utility functions U, the functional c identies the undominated
alternatives of each set in X. Since dominated alternatives are never chosen, the
decision maker should be indierent between choosing an option out of x 2 X, or out
of c(x). Hence, for the purposes of our representation, only the set of undominated
alternatives is relevant.
For each ex post utility function, the decision maker evaluates a menu x by the
lowest possible expected utility an undominated lottery in x can give her. This
reects her aversion towards indecisiveness. It is as if the decision maker pictures
herself choosing the worst possible option w.r.t. any possible realization of her ex
post utility function. Finally, the dierent possible ex post utility functions are
aggregated through the increasing function g.
Remark 1. Note that the set U of ex post utility functions plays a double role
in the representation. First, it determines the mapping x ! c(x), i.e. the set of
undominated options for each set x. The larger U, the larger c(x) for a given x.
Second, it determines the mapping c(x) ! (min2c(x) u  )u2U. The larger c(x),
4the lower min2c(x) u   for each u 2 U and, hence, the lower the ex ante utility
of x since g is increasing. In the extreme case where the decision maker does not
anticipate any possibility of being indecisive, U reduces to a singleton so that the




u    max
2x0 u  :
That is, we are brought back to standard indirect utility for which opportunity sets
are ranked according to their optimal alternatives.
Remark 2. Recall that Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2001) derive the follow-

















where V  RB is a subjective state space and h : RV ! R is an aggregator. More-
over, h is decreasing if and only if preferences satisfy preference for commitment,
i.e.,
x  x
0 implies x % x
0.
Now let U =  V and dene g : RU ! R by, for all z 2 RV g(z) = h( z). Then, for



















and g is increasing if and only if h is decreasing. Consequently, whenever the set of
undominated options coincides with the full opportunity set, i.e., c(x) = x, our rep-
resentation formally coincides (by an appropriate change of variables) with Dekel,
Lipman, and Rustichini (2001)'s ordinal utility representation. This formal equiva-
lence, however, does no longer hold whenever c(x) 6= x.
53 Axioms and result
3.1 The Dominance Relation
In order to axiomatize our ideas, we rst derive from % a dominance relation %
over lotteries as follows: for all ;0 2 (B),
 %
 
0 , fg  conv(f;
0g):
We want to interpret this relation as saying that the decision maker decisively prefers
 over 0. In terms of our intended representation, this will correspond to the case
in which the utility associated with  is higher than that associated with 0, for all
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions in the set U.
To understand the intended interpretation, note that if the decision maker knows
that whatever her ex post preferences, she will weakly prefer  to 0, then adding
0 to the singleton menu fg should neither improve nor worsen this menu (the
convex hull is just to have a menu in X). In fact, in this case we should also have
conv(f;0g) % f0g.
Conversely, suppose that the decision maker does not decisively weakly prefer 
to 0. This may be the case for two reasons. First, she may decisively strictly prefer
0 to  (  0). In this case, adding 0 to the singleton menu fg should improve
this menu, so we should have conv(f;0g)  fg (as well as f0g  conv(f;0g)).
Second, she may have no decisive preference between  and 0. In this case, under
our assumption that she dislikes indecisiveness, we should have fg  conv(f;0g)
and f0g  conv(f;0g). In both cases, we do not have fg  conv(f;0g),
justifying the above denition (we will make this justication more precise below by
deriving all these properties of % from our axioms). It is important to emphasize
that the dominance relation % can (and in general will) be incomplete. We use ./
to denote incomparability between two options.
Remark 3. Note that our dominance preference relation closely corresponds
to Kreps (1979)'s \domination" relation, and also has a similar interpretation. The
only dierence is that in the absence of decisive preferences /dominance, the decision
maker prefers larger menus in Kreps' model whereas she prefers smaller menus in
our model. Of course, this just reects the fact that Kreps assumes that the decision
maker expects to learn her ex post preferences before choosing a lottery whereas we
assume she does not.
6Let us now dene the set ~ c(x) of undominated lotteries in a menu x 2 X by




Under our assumption that the decision maker rules out all dominated lotteries, she
should be indierent between choosing a lottery in x or in ~ c(x). Clearly, if % admits
an indecisiveness averse representation then c(x) = ~ c(x) for all x 2 X.
3.2 Axioms
The intuitive discussion above motivates the following axioms on the preference
relation % over X and % over (B), respectively.4
Axiom 1 (Weak order). % is complete and transitive.
Axiom 2 (Dominance transitivity). % is transitive.
Axiom 3 (Dominance independence). For all ;0;00 2 (B) and  2 (0;1),
if  % 0, then  + (1   )00 % 0 + (1   )00.
Axiom 4 (Dominance continuity). For all ;0;00;000 2 (B), the set f 2
[0;1]j + (1   )0 % 00 + (1   )000g is closed.
Axiom 5 (Indecisiveness aversion). For all x;x0 2 X, if for all  2 ~ c(x), there
exists 0 2 ~ c(x0) such that  % 0, then x % x0.
Axiom 6 (Undominated continuity). For all x;x0;(xn)n1;(x0
n)n1 2 X such
that ~ c(xn) ! ~ c(x) and ~ c(x0
n) ! ~ c(x0), if xn % x0
n for all n  1, then x % x0.
Axiom 1 is standard and without it a representation of preferences by a real-
valued function is impossible. Axiom 2 requires that the dominance preference
relation % dened above is transitive, i.e. if  dominates 0, 0 dominates 00, then
 dominates 00. While this appears to be a desirable property of the dominance
relation, it is important to note that it is not implied by the transitivity of %: indeed,
it may be that fg  conv (f;0g), 0  conv (f0;00g) and yet  6 conv (f;00g).
Hence, the need for Axiom 2.
Axiom 3 requires the dominance relation to satisfy independence. The interpre-
tation of this axiom is standard: when the two lotteries  and 0 are mixed in equal
proportions with a third 00, the decision maker faces the choice between  and
4The reader should keep in mind that % is the only primitive preference relation of our approach
whereby we use % , completely determined by %, for notational and iterpretational reasons only.
70 with probability  and the (trivial) choice between 00 and 00 with probability
(1   ). Hence, if  dominates 0, so should +(1 )00 dominate 0+(1 )00.
Axiom 4 imposes a continuity property on the dominance relation, by requiring that
the better- and the worse-sets of this relation are closed.
Axiom 5 captures the main assumption of our approach, the fact that the decision
maker dislikes situations of indecisiveness. Below we show that under Axiom 5,
the decision maker prefers sets x, which have smaller (w.r.t. inclusion) sets of
undominated options. Hence, the decision maker is worse-o if undominated, but
incomparable options are added to her choice set. To understand the intuition
behind this result, consider two lotteries,  and 0 such that  ./ 0. Consider the
two sets, fg and conv (f;0g). Note that ~ c(fg) = fg and ~ c(conv f;0g) =
conv f;0g. Since  % , but 0 6%  the axiom implies that fg % conv (f;0g).
Furthermore, since  6% 0, we have fg  conv (f;0g). Similarly, we obtain
f0g  conv (f;0g).
A further implication of Axiom 5 is that a set is evaluated only based on the
undominated options contained in it. To understand this, compare the sets x and
~ c(x). Since ~ c(x) = ~ c(~ c(x)), it follows that the condition of the Axiom is trivially
satised and we obtain x  ~ c(x). Hence, consistent with our intuition, the decision
maker who conforms to Axiom 5 acts as if he discards all dominated options in a
given opportunity set.
Axiom 6 is a continuity condition imposed on preferences over sets consisting
of undominated options. Since preferences over arbitrary sets can be reduced to
preferences over their respective sets of undominated options, this is the right notion
of continuity required for our representation.
3.3 Representation Theorem
We are now ready to state our representation theorem:
Theorem. There exists an indecisiveness averse representation of % if and only
if % satises axioms 1{6.
The proof of the theorem is relegated to the appendix. Here we provide a brief
sketch of the proof.
First, recall that % is an incomplete preference relation. Axioms 2, 3 and 4
correspond to the axioms used by Dubra, Maccheroni, and Ok (2004). This implies
that there exists a non-empty, closed and convex set U such that:
 %
 
0 i U    U  
0.
8The set U represents the set of subjective states of the decision maker and the
dominance relation indeed indicates that the comparison between  and 0 does not
depend on the realized subjective state.
We can, therefore, conclude that the two denitions of sets of undominated
options, c(x) and ~ c(x) are, in fact, equivalent. Since conv (c(x)) belongs to X,
and since Axiom 5 implies that the decision maker discards dominated options, we
obtain conv (c(x))  x for all x. We can, therefore restrict attention to comparisons
between sets of the form conv (c(x)) for some x. These preferences are complete
and transitive (by Axiom 1) and satisfy continuity (by Axiom 6). Therefore, they
can be represented by a continuous utility function, which by Axiom 5 is decreasing
with respect to set inclusion. The remainder of the proof consists in showing that
this function will take the form g
 






We have analyzed a representation of preferences over opportunity sets capturing
the notion of indecisiveness aversion. In our representation, the decision maker's
uncertainty about her ex post preferences is captured by means of a subjective state
space. Since this uncertainty does not resolve before the choice of option, it gives rise
to indecisiveness at the ex post stage. More specically, the decision maker discards
options that are clearly dominated, and evaluates the remaining set of undominated
options pessimistically, as if he would get the worst possible option in all subjective
states. This gives rise to a preference for commitment, in the sense of preferring
menus with fewer undominated options.
Our representation is ordinal in the sense that our aggregator is only required to
be monotone and continuous. It is natural to look for a more specic representation
in which the aggregator has a linear form. That is to say, we could look for a positive



















One thing to note about this representation is that it is not truly linear. This is
because it is not true that c(x + (1   )x0) = c(x) + (1   )c(x0) in general. In
fact, it is only true that c(x + (1   )x0)  c(x) + (1   )c(x0) but the converse
does not hold because, roughly speaking, by mixing between two menus one gets
rid of some undominated options. Therefore, this representation does not imply the
independence axiom, but only the following, weaker axiom: For all x1;x2;  x;y1;y2 2
9X and  2 (0;1) such that conv(c(yi)) = conv(c(xi)+(1 )c( x)), i = 1;2, if x1 %
x2 then y1 % y2. This makes it tempting to try to work on the class fconv(c(x))jx 2
Xg and parallel the proof of Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2001); Dekel, Lipman,
Rustichini, and Sarver (2007a)'s linear utility representation theorem. However,
since this class is not convex, a similar argument to theirs (in particular for lemma
S11 in Dekel, Lipman, Rustichini, and Sarver, 2007b) is not at hand in our model.
We leave the problem of axiomatizing a linear representation of indecisivness averse
preferences for future research.
10Appendix: proofs
We start with two lemmas:
Lemma 1. Assume that there exists U  RB such that % satises (1). Then:
1. For all x 2 X, c(x) = ~ c(x).
2. For all x 2 X, conv(c(x)) 2 X.
Proof of lemma 1.
1. Follows immediately from (1) and the denitions of c(x) and ~ c(x).
2. First, c(x) in nonempty since x is compact (Eliaz and Ok, 2006, lemma 3).
Since a polytope has only nitely many faces and each of these faces is closed, it is
sucient to show that c(x) is a union of faces of x. Let  2 c(x). We know that
 belongs to the relative interior of some face f of x (Rockafellar, 1970, theorem
18.2). It is sucient to show that f  c(x). Suppose there exists 0 2 f such that
0 = 2 c(x). Then, clearly, 0 6= . Moreover, by part 1 of the lemma, there exists
 0 2 x such that U  ( 0   0) > 0. Now, since  belongs to the relative interior of
f, there exists 00 2 f and  2 (0;1) such that  = 0 + (1   )00 (Rockafellar,
1970, theorem 6.4). Let   =  0 +(1 )00. Then U (   ) = U ( 0  0) > 0,
so  = 2 c(x), a contradiction. Consequently, (4) is indeed well-dened since c(x) is
non-empty and closed for all x 2 X.
Lemma 2. Assume % satises axioms 1{6. Then:
1. For all ;0;00 2 (B) and  2 (0;1),  % 0 if and only if  + (1  
)000 + (1   )00.
2. For all x;x0 2 X, if c(x)  c(x0), then x % x0.
3. For all x 2 X, conv(c(x)) 2 X.
4. For all x 2 X, x  conv(c(x)).
5. For all ;0 2 (B),
 
 














11Proof of lemma 2.
1. Follows from axioms 1{4 (Dubra, Maccheroni, and Ok, 2004, lemma 1).
2. Follows immediately from axiom 5.
3. By axioms 1{4, there exists a non-empty, closed, convex set U  RB such
that % satises (1) (Dubra, Maccheroni, and Ok, 2004). Hence the result follows
from lemma 1.2.
4. By parts 2 and 3 of the lemma, it is sucient to prove that ~ c(conv(~ c(x))) =
~ c(x). First, we show that for all  2 x, there exists 0 2 ~ c(x) such that 0. Let
y = f  2 xj  % g. Since x is compact and % is continuous (Dubra, Maccheroni,
and Ok, 2004, proposition 1), y is compact and, hence, there exists 0 2 y such that
   0 for no   2 y (Eliaz and Ok, 2006, lemma 3). Suppose    0 for some
  2 xny. Since 0 by denition of y, it follows that     by transitivity of %,
so   2 y, a contradiction. Hence 0 2 ~ c(x).
Now, by denition, ~ c(x) = f 2 xj@0 2 x;0g and ~ c(conv(~ c(x))) = f 2
conv(~ c(x))j@0 2 conv(~ c(x));0g. Let z = f 2 conv(~ c(x))j@0 2 x;0g. Then
z = ~ c(x) \ conv(~ c(x)) = ~ c(x). We show that ~ c(conv(~ c(x))) = z. Clearly, z 
~ c(conv(~ c(x))) since conv(~ c(x))  x. Conversely, let  2 conv(~ c(x)) n z. Then there
exists 0 2 x such that 0. By the argument above, there then exists 00 2 ~ c(x)
such that 000 and, hence, 00, so  = 2 ~ c(conv(~ c(x))). Hence ~ c(conv(~ c(x)))  z.
5. The indierence property follows immediately from the denition of %. Now,
for all ;0 2 (B), we obviously have ~ c(fg) = fg and ~ c(f0g) = f0g. Moreover,




> > > <
> > > :
fg if   0;
f0g if 0;
conv(f;0g)) if  0 or  ./ 0:
We now show that  % 0 implies conv(f;0g) % f0g. Suppose  % 0 and
f0g  conv(f;0g). Then fg  conv(f;0g) by denition of % and, hence,
f0g  fg by transitivity of %. But since ~ c(fg) = fg, ~ c(f0g) = f0g, and
 % 0, we have fg % f0g by axiom 5, a contradiction. This establishes the
strict preference property as well as the ( part of the noncomparability property.
For the ) part, assume  ./ 0. Then ~ c(fg)  ~ c(conv(f;0g)) and ~ c(f0g) 
~ c(conv(f;0g)), so we have fg % conv(f;0g) and f0g % conv(f;0g) by part 2
of the lemma. Suppose these two preferences are in fact indierences. Then   0,
a contradiction. Hence one of the two must be strict. Suppose the other one is an
12indierence. Then we face the same contradiction as above. Hence both preferences
are strict.
Proof of the Representation Theorem. Obviously, axiom 1 is necessary
for a representation to exist. Given this axiom, we know that % is reexive and,
hence, axioms 2{4 are necessary and sucient for the existence of a non-empty,
closed, convex set U  RB such that % satises (1) (Dubra, Maccheroni, and Ok,
2004). It remains to prove that axioms 5 and 6 are necessary and sucient for the
existence of a continuous and weakly increasing aggregator g : U(X) ! R such that
% satises (4). It is easy to check that these axioms are necessary. The remainder
of this section is devoted to the suciency proof.
Assume % satises axioms 1{6. Let C = fconv(c(x))jx 2 Xg. Clearly, for all
x 2 X and u 2 U, we have min2c(x) u   = min2conv(c(x)) u  . Hence, by lemma
2.3{2.4, it is sucient to nd a continuous and weakly increasing aggregator g such


















Since C is a subset of a separable metric space (Klein and Thompson, 1984), axioms
1 and 6 imply the existence of a continuous utility function v : C ! R such that,
for all x;x0 2 C, x % x0 if and only if v(x)  v(x0) (Debreu, 1954). We now claim
that for all x;x0 2 C, if min2x u  min2x0 u for all u 2 U, then x % x0. If the
claim is correct, then we can dene the aggregator g : U(C) = U(X) ! R by, for
all (ru)u2U 2 U(C), g((ru)u2U) = v(x) for any x 2 C such that (min2x u  )u2U =
(ru)u2U. Moreover, it is clear that g is then weakly increasing, so the proof is
complete.
To prove the claim, let x 2 C and dene the sets
y = f 2 R
Bj8u 2 U;u    min
2x
u  g;
z = f 2 R
Bj9 2 x;U    U  g:
By (1) and axiom 5, it is sucient to show that z = y. Dene the set k = f 2
RBjU  0g. Then k is a closed convex cone and, more precisely, is the polar of the
cone generated by  U. Clearly, z = x+k. Since x is a polytope and k is closed and
convex, z is closed and convex (Rockafellar, 1970, theorem 20.3) and, hence, is equal
to the intersection of all closed half-spaces containing it (Rockafellar, 1970, theorem
11.5). For all u 2 RB, dene the set hu = f 2 RBju  inf02z u0g. Clearly, we
13have z =
T
fhuju 2 RBg =
T
fhuju 2 V g, where V = fu 2 RBjinf02z u0 >  1g.
By denition,  V is the barrier cone of z and, hence, is the polar of the recession
cone of z (Rockafellar, 1970, corollary 14.2.1). But since x is a polytope, the recession
cone of z is the recession cone of k and, since k is a cone, the recession cone of k
is k. Thus  V is the polar of k and, hence is the cone generated by  U. Since U
is convex, this latter cone is
S
fUj  0g and, since hu = hu for all  > 0 by
denition, we have z =
T
fhuju 2 Ug. Finally, since k is a cone and x is a polytope,
inf02z u0 >  1 implies inf02z u0 = min02x u0, so the latter equality implies
z = y.
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